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I. INTRODUCTION
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan," the Supreme Court estab-
lished a constitutionally based conditional privilege for protecting free
speech in the context of defamation actions. The privilege creates a
presumption of good faith, insulating the speaker from liability unless
the plaintiff shows by clear and convincing evidence that the publica-
tion was made with "actual malice." 2 The Court has chosen a "status
approach"3 limitation to the privilege, applying it only when the plain-
tiff has the status of "public official" or "public figure." 4
Lower court applications of the New York Times conditional
privilege are inconsistent from state to state and often inconsistent
with the Supreme Court's mandate, because, in part, New York Times
and its progeny have not provided clear guidance in defining these
In part, this is a response to another law review article: David Finkelson, The Status/
Conduct Continuum: Injecting Rhyme and Reason Into Contemporary Public Official Defamation
Doctrine, 84 VA. L. REV. 871 (1998). While Mr. Finkelson recognizes that application of the
New York Times conditional privilege should result from a specific balance, his conception of the
factors to be considered in the balance and his suggested solutions are antithetical to those
offered in the present Comment.
* Graduate, Seattle University School of Law, 2000. The author would like to thank the
truly inspirational Connie Krontz.
1. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. Actual malice is defined as knowledge or reckless disregard of falsity. Id. The condi-
tional privilege of New York Times is sometimes referred to as "the actual malice standard" in
both this Comment and in defamation case law.
3. The "status approach" is a shorthand method of referring to the Supreme Court's choice
to use the status of the plaintiff as the triggering mechanism for application of the New York
Times conditional privilege. See Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 337, 346 (1974).
4. Id. at 342.
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public plaintiffs. As a result, courts generally resort to a reexamina-
tion of the principles underlying the decision in New York Times.
Unfortunately, lower courts do not evince consistent application
of the principles either. Courts repeat the now familiar statements of
New York Times in a myriad of combinations to lend support to what-
ever decision they reach-whether increasing constitutional protec-
tions of speech or preserving the state's power and laws of redress for
reputational injury. As New York Times and its progeny have dis-
cussed the underlying principles at great length, language from the
cases can be used selectively to support the courts' varying positions.
However, it is only out of context that the language can be so misused.
Although the Supreme Court has struggled in addressing the
issues at stake, appearing to vacillate at times, it has continually cor-
rected and refined its position. As a whole, however, a theme can be
derived from New York Times and its progeny: an application of the
privilege only for certain types of speech. A more precise explication
of this theme should allow lower courts to apply the status approach
more accurately and consistently. This Comment reflects an attempt
to distill the Supreme Court's thematic intent from over thirty years of
defamation case law. The Comment then evaluates current definitions
of public officials and public figures to determine whether they are
consistent with the theme. Washington courts have already addressed
these definitions, but this Comment posits that Washington law on
public officials and public figures is inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's intent and suggests alternative defining tests for public offi-
cials and public figures.
II. PERSPECTIVE ON PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING NEW YORK TIMES
The New York Times conditional privilege is usually said to be a
compromise between state defamation laws and constitutional rights.6
This statement reflects the two interests at stake in defamation cases:
the state's interest in protecting reputation by providing redress for
injury through legal means,7 and the constitutional constraints of the
First Amendment.! However, these interests are not treated equally
5. A state's common law actions available to defamation plaintiffs are referred to through-
out this Comment as state defamation laws.
6. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966). For a discussion on costs and benefits of
the compromise, see Frederick Schauer, Public Figures, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 905, 910-12
(1983/1984).
7. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 276, 284. Other interests such as privacy or regulating an
employer's relationship with employees are similar to protecting reputation, but do not exemplify
the balance sought by New York Times. Compare New York Times, 376 U.S. 254 (1976) with
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) and Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
8. Although there are multiple purposes of the First Amendment, see Curtis Publishing
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by all courts, and the operative compromise between the two interests
is affected by the relative values of each interest as seen through the
eyes of the reviewing court.
For example, seen from a historical perspective, the previously
unchallenged value of state defamation law was merely qualified by
the New York Times Court's recognition of the competing values
underlying free speech. Thus, the New York Times privilege can be
viewed as a cost extracted from personal reputation; 9 and reputation
should be given considerable protection.'"
Seen from another perspective, however, First Amendment
rights are paramount. Under this perspective," state defamation laws
are burdens to free speech that must be strictly limited.' 2 Thus, New
York Times and its progeny delineate, in relief, the circumstances
under which defamation laws may be tolerated.
The operative compromise between these competing interests is
therefore affected by an interpreting court's starting perspective. If a
court desires to follow the guidance of New York Times and its prog-
eny, however, it must adopt the compromise as laid out by the
Supreme Court.'" The Court has worked out its compromise based on
a recognition of the value of reputation and a particular understanding
of the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment protects
true speech, and protects false speech inasmuch as it is an unavoidable
attendant to public debate. 4 Although there is no social value in the
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 149 (1975) (Harlan, J.), here, the issue is the interest of the public in
public speech as a necessary component of democratic governance. See infra note 33 and accom-
panying text.
9. See Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Con-
stitution, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 691 (1986), for a thorough analysis of the history of reputation, the
key concepts of reputation, and their relationship to the Constitution.
10. See Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1973).
11. Primarily, this predilection is expressed in the manner of application of the New York
Times' actual malice standard. See, e.g., Clardy v. Cowles, 81 Wash. App. 53, 912 P.2d 1078
(1996).
12. In general, defamation laws are not evaluated as state actions that must pass a "strict
scrutiny" analysis when the defamatory statement is political in nature. See generally Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). However, New York Times specifically opens that door by holding that
the constitutional limitations at issue apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
376 U.S. at 276-77. For a case attempting a strict scrutiny evaluation, see Gaylord Entertain-
ment Co. v. Thompson, 958 P.2d 128 (Okla. 1998).
13. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 84 (1966) (holding that public officials must be
defined by constitutional rather than state law standards).
14. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 271. The rhetoric throughout New York Times and its
progeny on the constitutional protection of false speech is conflicting. For instance, in New York
Times, the court states that speech is not stripped of constitutional protection simply because it is
false. Id. at 271, 273. On the other hand, Gertz begins its analysis by reminding us that there is
no constitutional value in false statements of fact. 418 U.S. at 340. These seemingly opposing
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content of false speech,15 liability for false speech is not without a
social cost. Fear of such liability may prevent some persons from
entering the arena of public debate and thereby limit the overall
quantity of speech. 6 Expressing concern over this potential for self-
censorship, the Supreme Court has provided constitutional protections
for false speech.' 7  The protections create "breathing space"' 8 for
important speech and promote unfettered public debate.' 9 The
protection of false speech is not considered too costly for competing
interests, because false speech is redressable within the field of public
debate: we can redress false speech with more speech.2"
However, this evaluation is no longer wholly appropriate when
false speech injures reputation, as is the nature of defamation. An
individual's reputation interest is recognized as uniquely valuable in
our society.2' The interest requires special protection, because addi-
tional speech is often insufficient to redress injury to reputation:
22
enter state defamation laws.
However, as even defamatory speech is valuable for providing
breathing space, defamatory speech also receives a measure of consti-
tutional protection under the New York Times conditional privilege.
23
The appropriate formulation of the privilege, as a compromise be-
tween state defamation laws and First Amendment concerns, will
depend on a specific evaluation: under what conditions is the social
value of defamatory speech, as a provider of breathing space, greater
than the social value of reputation? Or, more precisely, when is pro-
statements are reconcilable, because the actual meaning of the Gertz statement becomes clear
from the remainder of the opinion. False speech retains constitutional protection, and does have
a constitutionally protected function. See id. at 341. For a contrary view, see Bruce J. Borrus,
Defamation and the First Amendment: Protecting Speech on Public Issues, 56 WASH L. REV 75,
92-94 (1980) (asserting that Gertz excluded false statements of fact from core constitutional
protection).
15. "Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances society's interest
in ... debate on public issues." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340.
16. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 423 (1988).
17. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 271.
18. Id. at 272 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1962)).
19. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1948); see generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1 (1976).
20. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 47 (1971).
21. "[T~he individual's right to the protection of his own good name 'reflects no more than
our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being-a concept at the root
of any decent system of ordered liberty. The protection of private personality, like the protection
of life itself, is left primarily to the individual States under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.
But this does not mean that the right is entitled to any less recognition by this Court as a basic of
our constitutional system."' Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341, (citing Rosenblatt v. Baer, 373 U.S. 75, 92
(1966) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
22. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344 n.9.
23. See id. at 340-41
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tection against self-censorship more important than protection of repu-
tational interest? Since New York Times, the Supreme Court has
expressed concern with self-censorship primarily in regard to certain
types of speech.
Speech type" may be viewed along a continuum: on one end,
core political speech; at the other end, speech on private matters. 25
Between these ends is all remaining speech. Where exactly on this
continuum the public/private distinction lies probably requires per-
manent theoretical exploration.26 Precise categorization of specific
speech is equally difficult. The following evaluation, therefore, merely
serves to provide rough divisions within the speech continuum.
Near the core political speech end of the continuum is a type of
speech this Comment will refer to as "public issue" speech. Gener-
ally, public issue speech concerns social and political issues that a self-
governed people must include in their discussions, such as civil rights,
27crime, or poverty.
Further down the continuum from political speech and public
issue speech is what this Comment will refer to as "public interest"
speech or "speech on issues of public interest. ' 28  Public interest
24. Terminology, of course, varies. "Type" in this Comment refers to the matter at issue,
such as political speech or private speech. "Content" in this Comment will refer to whether
speech is defamatory, or obscene, or truthful, for instance.
25. There are numerous articles that discuss distinctions of different types of speech. See,
e.g., Marc A. Franklin, Constitutional Libel Law: The Role of Content, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1657
(1987) (dividing the spectrum of speech into speech that relates to self governance and speech
that does not); R. George Wright, Speech on Matters of Public Interest and Concern, 37 DEPAUL
L. REV. 27 (1987) (dividing the spectrum of speech into speech on "matters of public interest
and concern" (MOPIC) and speech which is non-MOPIC); Bruce J. Borrus, Defamation and the
First Amendment: Protecting Speech on Public Issues, 56 WASH. L. REV. 75 (1980) (dividing
speech into core and peripheral constitutionally important speech). See also Richard Barkley,
The Evolution of a Public Issue: New York Times Through Greenmoss, 57 U. COLO. L. REV.
773 (1986) (following the idea of a public/private distinction in speech through Supreme Court
defamation cases); See also infra note 28.
26. Many articles have recognized or discussed various permutations of speech and dis-
cussed appropriate constitutional protections. See, e.g., Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amend-
ment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245; Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principals and Some First
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971). Compare Wright, supra note 25, with Franklin,
supra note 25.
27. This concept, speech relating to self governance, could be thought of as "quasi" politi-
cal speech. The concept has been recognized by scholars in various forms described by a variety
of terms. See supra note 26. See also Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Dis-
course: Outrageous Opinion Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103
HARV. L. REV. 603 (1990) (terming "speech about matters that ought to be of interest to those
who practice the art of democratic self governance" as the "normative conception of public con-
cern").
28. Like speech of importance to self governance, speech of public interest as a touchstone
for constitutional protection has been widely discussed. See supra note 26. It achieved wide-
spread use in case law after its appearance in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
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speech covers a broad range of nonprivate speech, whether viewed as
the equivalent to "public and general interest" from Warren and
Brandeis' famous article on privacy21 or whether a more modern con-
ception.3°
The exact First Amendment protection available for speech at
any given point along the continuum varies. However, for protection
through the New York Times conditional privilege, the Supreme Court
has clearly been aiming at a certain range of speech. The Court has
consistently3' expressed that it was only for political speech and speech
on public issues that self-censorship was a concern.32 Only in this
context does the need to promote true speech supersede legitimate
state interests in protecting reputation, requiring constitutional protec-
tion of falsehoods through use of the actual malice standard. Without
this context, courts cannot properly apply the New York Times condi-
tional privilege to public plaintiffs.
Of course, it is just as impossible (and judicially inadvisable) for
courts to attempt to determine where the public issue/public interest
transformation occurs as it is for courts to determine the line between
private speech and public speech generally.33 The Supreme Court,
See, e.g., Kahn v. Bower, 232 Cal. App. 3d 1599, 1611 (1991), Kelley v. Boney, 606 A.2d 693
(Conn. 1992).
29. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
214 (1890). The major theme of the article is that legal precedent, public policy, and human
need all support a "right to privacy." However, the authors argued that this right would not
extend to matters of public or general interest. See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
30. There has been a significant lack of clarity between the terms "public or general con-
cern, "public interest," "public issues," and "public concern." See supra note 26 and accompa-
nying text. Thus, pointing to the affirmative use of any of these terms within a case proves little.
However, from its use in case law it is clear that the term "public interest" is generally interpret-
ed to mean all speech within the public realm. See Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 43-44. It is probably
broader than "public concern." See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472
U.S. 749 (1985). See generally Rodney A. Smolla, Dun and Bradstreet, Hepps, and Liberty Lob-
by: A New Analytic Primer on the Future Course of Defamation, 75 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1541 (1987).
If "public interest" is interpreted to mean anything the public is interested in or newsworthy, it is
certainly broader than the Warren and Brandeis' term "public or general concern." See Warren
& Brandeis, supra note 29, and infra note 51.
31. But see Franklin, supra note 26, at 1660.
32. This is the particular balance for clearly defamatory speech. Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S.
323, 348 (1973) (announcing its conclusion obtains where "the substance of the defamatory state-
ment 'makes substantial danger to reputation apparent' (citation omitted)). See also, Schauer,
supra note 6 (appeal for recognition of this concept); Franklin, supra note 25, at 1663 (recognition
of this concept).
33. As noted, there is significant diversity of opinion in how to differentiate between speech
types. See Franklin, supra note 25, at 1678-79 ("no plausible line in this area is self defining");
id. at 1668 (noting that speakers are better able to recognize a content-related line than the a
status-related line); Post, supra note 27, at 671 (what should constitute public discourse is
appropriately defined by the actual public discourse itself); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343 ("[A]d hoc
resolution of the competing interests at stake in each case is not feasible...").
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however, has not required states to do so. Rather, the Court has cho-
sen the status approach as a method of serving its views of the compet-
ing values at stake.34
By employing the status approach, the Court does not limit its
protection of speech regarding public persons to core political speech
or even to public issue speech. Yet, not all speech of public interest is
covered under this approach. Rather, the shape of constitutional pro-
tection follows the contours of status.3" Courts should still consider
the type of speech of concern to the Supreme Court when they define
public plaintiffs. This consideration provides a context by which to
fill in and help define any areas of the status approach that are
unclear.36
III. DETERMINING THE SUPREME COURT'S AREA OF CONCERN
In New York Times, an elected commissioner brought a libel
action against the publishers of a defamatory political advertisement
that appeared to criticize his performance in office.37 The Court cre-
ated the now-famous conditional privilege for such defamatory publi-
cations regarding the official conduct of public officials. The Court
implied that the privilege serves to protect speech that criticizes gov-
ernment. Thus, the decision in New York Times can be interpreted as
being concerned only with core political speech.38
This objective is mirrored by the subsequent decision of Rosen-
blatt v. Baer.39 In Rosenblatt, the Court remanded the suit of a county
employee to the trial court for a determination of the plaintiffs
status.4" The Court found the employee might meet its definition of
public official because of the light in which the plaintiff painted his
34. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346. There is considerable academic criticism regarding this
choice. See David J. Branson & Sharon A. Sprague, The Public Figure-Private Person Dicho-
tomy: A Flight from First Amendment Reality, 90 DICK. L. REv. 627 (1986); David Finkelson,
The Status/Conduct Continuum: Injecting Rhyme and Reason Into Contemporary Public Official
Defamation Doctrine, 84 VA. L. REv. 871, (1998); Franklin, supra note 25.
35. The Court recognizes the differential outcomes likely under the status approach.
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344. However, status provides a finer, more discriminating instrument of reg-
ulation and gives better protection to individual reputations. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 68, 69 (1971), (Harlan, J., dissenting).
36. Thus, this Comment advocates a concurrent application of sorts. For a similar view-
point, see Franklin, supra note 25 (advocating the use of content as the primary touchstone for
differential protections for speech in libel context and proposing modifications to the status
approach to accommodate content.)
37. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
38. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 153 (1975); Finkelson, supra note 34, at
875; Barkley, supra note 25, at 775-77.
39. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
40. Id. at 88.
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claim.41 In presenting his theory of recovery, the employee repre-
sented himself as holding a publicly prominent position of importance
within the government, and he demonstrated that he was publicly
considered to be responsible for the successes and failures of a county-
owned and run recreation area.42
However, the Rosenblatt opinion is very conservative in its use of
language, focusing its analysis of public officials on core political
speech aspects: "[D]ebate on public issues ... may include ... sharp
attacks on government and public officials""; "Criticism of govern-
ment is at the very center of ... free discussion"; "Criticism of those
responsible for government operations must be free, lest criticism of
government itself be penalized."44
A conservative reading of Baer is consistent with the origination
of the New York Times privilege: as the constitutional protection
superseding state defamation laws was newly set out, it would not be
unusual if the privilege was intended to be interpreted as a minimal
intrusion into the field. Even the breadth of "official conduct," any-
thing that might touch on an official's fitness for office,4" is congruent
with a narrow privilege when applied to speech critical of govern-
ment.46
However, the language of New York Times itself supports an
extension of its protection to a somewhat broader range of speech. In
discussing the fundamental issues involved, the New York Times
Court referred to "debate on public issues"47 and "freedom of expres-
sion upon public questions. 4 ' This language supports a moderate
extension, indicating that constitutional protection is necessary for a
41. Id. at 87.
42. Id. at 77.
43. Id. at 85 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
44. Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 85
45. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964). Garrison noted that it would be unfair
to allow public officials a broader range of commentary privilege than the private persons they
serve. Id. at 74. The Court in New York Times intended a relatively broad interpretation of"official conduct," because it analogized its rule to the common law privilege of speech by public
officials, which extends to statements made even within the "outer perimeter" in a public offi-
cial's line of duty. Id. at 282.
46. See Franklin, supra note 25, at 1661 (arguing that speech critical of government has a
broad scope).
47. 376 U.S. at 270.
48. Id. at 269. Despite the incidence of this broader language, (e.g., "unfettered inter-
change of ideas for bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people," id. at
269 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)); " to speak one's mind.. . on all
public institutions," id. (quoting Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941)); "debate on
public issues ... may include attacks on government officials," id. at 270; "one of the major pub-
lic issues of our time" id. at 271), this Comment posits that only a moderate increase in scope of
the New York Times conditional privilege is appropriate.
1162 [Vol. 23:1155
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broader range of speech. While not core political speech, this type of
speech is still very important and public in nature. It certainly resem-
bles "public issue" speech.
For a time, however, the Court supported an expansive applica-
tion of the privilege to cases involving public interest speech with the
holding in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia.49 With an insightful critique on
the problems of categorizing public figures particularly, the Court in
Rosenbloom rejected the status approach in favor of protecting all
speech of "general or public concern." So The court acknowledged that
the term "general or public concern" came from the Warren and
Brandeis article,"' but they also used the term "public interest"
throughout the opinion.52 Therefore, it is unclear exactly what speech
the Court believed would be included under this approach. Notwith-
standing any inconsistencies in approach, the Rosenbloom Court
espoused strong First Amendment protection for speech reaching
further down the continuum than speech on public issues."
This expanded protection of speech was rejected in Gertz v.
Welch.54 In Gertz, a public official had been convicted of murder, and
49. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
50. Id. The Rosenbloom expansion was probably predicated on a combination of factors: First,
the belief that speech in the realm of public interest should receive constitutional protection, as speech
of public interest was a common thread in earlier cases, and second, the expanded and poorly
delineated application of New York Times to include public figures. See Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1975). The inclusion of public figures under the New York Times conditional
privilege greatly increased the amount of speech ultimately covered; thus, the Rosenbloom expansion
was not a great departure from contemporary practical application of New York Times.
51. Warren and Brandeis, supra note 29. Ironically, the term as used by Warren and Brandeis
more closely circumscribes speech covered by the status approach rather than speech identified by its
location on a continuum. They offer a definition of what is not of public or general concern, as a
method of describing what is of public concern:
In general, then, the matters of which the publication should be repressed may be
described as those which concern the private life, habits, acts and relations of an indi-
vidual, and have no legitimate connection with his fitness for a public office which he
seeks or for which he is suggested, or for any public or quasi public position which he
seeks or for which he is suggested, and have no legitimate relation to or bearing upon
any act done by him in a public or quasi public capacity... Some things all men alike
are entitled to keep from popular curiosity, whether in public life or not, while others
are only private because the persons concerned have not assumed a position which
makes their doings legitimate matters of public investigation.
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 29, at 216.
52. "[T]he First Amendment extends to myriad matters of public interest." Rosenbloom,
403 U.S. at 42; "If a matter is a subject of public or general interest... [t]he public's primary
interest is in the event .. " Id. at 43. This usage lends the Rosenbloom decision a breadth that
appears to extend far down the speech continuum, into "public interest" speech.
53. It is unclear whether the Rosenbloom Court meant to protect anything the press decided
was "newsworthy" or of subjective interest to the public, or whether they intended to stop some-
where short of that line. However, public interest has been interpreted by lower courts very broadly.
See supra note 29.
54. 418 U.S. 323 (1973).
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the plaintiff, Gertz, was an attorney who represented the official in a
subsequent civil action. A magazine article published during the rep-
resentation labeled Gertz as a communist. Upon review of the result-
ing libel suit, the appellate court accepted that the New York Times
conditional privilege applied to any public issue without regard to the
plaintiff's status.55
Citing inadequate protection of both interests involved, the
Supreme Court rejected both the speech-type approach 6 and the idea
that speech of public interest was important enough to obtain the spe-
cific constitutional protection provided by New York Times. 7
Gertz, although rejecting a speech-type approach, nonetheless
supports the view that the Court is looking to protect public issue
speech. By rejecting protection of public interest speech, requiring a
status approach, and defining public figures in a narrow fashion, 8 the
Gertz Court did not display concern with protecting all, or even most,
speech of public interest. Rather, it showed concern with protecting
speech that is likely to be covered under its limited definition of public
figures.
Gertz espoused a limited definition of public figures.59 A limited
definition of public figures covers less territory in the realm of public
speech and focuses on protection of speech toward the political end of
the continuum. More recent public figure cases have also come down
in clear support of a limited definition of public figures, thus, demon-
strating a concern for speech on public issues, not for speech of public
interest.6°
For example, in Times v. Firestone, the Court held that the wife
of a wealthy businessman was not a public figure, because the details
of her divorce proceedings were not the type of event appropriately
protected by the actual malice standard. 61  "To equate a person's
involvement in an event of public interest with involvement in public
affairs would be to reinstate the Rosenbloom expansion."62
55. See id.
56. Id. at 346-48.
57. Times v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 456 (1976) (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344-46). Fire-
stone interpreted Gertz as rejecting not only the speech-type approach, but also in rejecting sup-
port for constitutional protection for defamatory falsehoods in the area of "public or general
interest." Id. at 454.
58. See Gertz, 418 U.S. 323.
59. See id.
60. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1975).
61. 424 U.S. at 455-56.
62. Id. at 454. The extension of the New York Times conditional privilege to public figures,
on the surface, appears to support an application of the actual malice standard to defamation
cases involving even "public interest" speech. However, a careful examination of the cases
refutes such a conclusion. See, e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1975). See
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In Wolston v. Reader's Digest Association, where the plaintiff was
a relative of and agreed to testify at the trial of admitted Russian spies,
the Court stated the argument differently: private persons do not
become public persons just because they are involved, however self-
determinedly, in an issue of public interest.63
The public figure cases, then, illustrate that the actual malice
standard is not intended to be applied to protect speech on issues of
public interest. This approach is consistent with recent Supreme
Court cases on defamation issues, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc.," and Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., v. Hepps,6s which
deal with First Amendment protections required for speech of "public
concern." These decisions held that when allegedly defamatory
speech is of public concern, the plaintiff, public or private, must bear
the burden of proving falsity and may only recover nonpunitive dam-
ages.66
As might be expected, it is unclear exactly what the Court means
by "public concern., 67 If the term does not extend to public interest
speech, then this test also supports the argument that the Court is
more concerned with speech closer to the political end of the spec-
trum. If the term is meant to equate to public interest speech, then
these cases illustrate that there are methods of protecting public inter-
est speech other than the demanding actual malice standard of the
New York Times conditional privilege, thereby relieving courts of the
need to stretch the definitions of public persons to provide protection
for such speech.
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that the Supreme Court has
consistently espoused concern for constitutional protection of defama-
tory speech only in the context of speech on public issues and for
political speech. Stepping back from case analysis, this concern also
reflects common sense. Under what conditions do we as a society care
whether a person refrains from publishing obviously defamatory
material unless certain of its truth?68 The answer is where silence is
infra note 132 and accompanying text.
63. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Association, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 167 (1979). The Court in
Wolston assumes arguendo that propriety of the actions of law enforcement officials in investigat-
ing and prosecuting suspected Soviet agents is a "public controversy." Law enforcement is prob-
ably the sort of issue for debate for a self-governed people. Further, the Court indicated that
there must be controversy or debate, not just an "issue."
64. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
65. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
66. See Greenmoss, 472 U.S. at 749 and Hepps, 475 U.S. at 767.
67. See Barkley, supra note 25, for an evaluation of the meaning of this term.
68. Note, however, that Gertz established negligence as a minimum fault standard for pri-
vate persons. 418 U.S. at 347. For a discussion on the effect of a negligence standard on the
2000] 1165
Seattle University Law Review
worse than the injury-where our democratic existence needs issues
addressed regularly and vigorously. Do we care if a gossip columnist
hesitates to publish celebrity dirt rather than risk liability if the con-
tent of the publication is false? Are the morals of a minor government
employee a threat to democracy such that a speaker needs the freedom
to publish without taking reasonable steps to be accurate?
Such are the freedoms allowed through broad application of the
actual malice standard. Therefore, when defining public officials and
public figures, courts must keep in mind the types of speech intended
to be protected and why. If these terms are defined too broadly,
defamatory falsehoods receive an unjustified quantum of protection.
IV. DEFINING PUBLIC OFFICIALS
State courts have had difficulty articulating and applying the
Supreme Court's definition of public officials. The New York Times
decision only made clear that the term "public official" included elect-
ed officials, but not all public employees.69 The Court left the task of
formulating a more specific definition for later cases, providing its best
definition of public official in Rosenblatt."
The Rosenblatt decision appears to formulate two separate defi-
nitions of public officials, and many courts have interpreted the deci-
sion that way.71 First, the Court stated that the designation "public
official," includes, "at the very least ... government employees who
have or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for, or
control over the conduct of governmental affairs."7" Second, the Court
offered the following:
Where a position in government has such apparent importance
that the public has an independent interest in the qualifications
and performance of the person who holds it, beyond the general
public interest in the qualifications and performance of all gov-
ernment employees.., the New York Times malice standards
apply. 3
The most accurate interpretation of this passage, based on both
context and on an understanding of the type of defamatory speech the
media and suggested solutions, see John L. Diamond, Rethinking Media Liability for Defamation
of Public Figures, 5 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 289 (1996).
69. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
70. Rosenblatt v. Bear, 383 U.S. 75, 83-87 (1966).
71. See David Elder, Defamation, Public Officialdom and the Rosenblatt v. Baer Criteria-A
Proposal for Revivification: Two Decades After New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 33 BUFF. L.
REV. 579 (1984).
72. Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 85.
73. Id. at 86.
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Court seeks to protect, is that the second statement is merely an expla-
nation justifying constitutional encroachment upon defamation laws.74
It means only that in certain circumstances, when a person occupies a
position in government that is of high apparent importance, or, as the
Court stated earlier in the opinion, when a person has or appears to
have substantial responsibility for or control over some aspect of gov-
ernment, society's interest 75 in free speech is greater than its interest in
redressing that person's injured reputation.
The definition of public official from Rosenblatt, then, is based
on control over government, responsibility for governmental decisions,
or a position otherwise of importance in government. These factors
may be an actuality or may only appear to be the case. 76 Most impor-
tantly, the position must have a relationship to government such that
74. But see Elder, supra note 71, at 666 (indicating that in order to avoid problems applying
Rosenblatt, the second "alternative" definition should not be used "offhandedly"). Elder appears
to equate the term "interest" in the second alternative with "curiosity" rather than as a stake-
holder interest. Thus, Elder focuses significant attention on footnote 13 of the Rosenblatt opin-
ion, which says:
It is suggested that this test might apply to a night watchman accused of stealing state
secrets. But a conclusion that the New York Times malice standards apply could not
be reached merely because a statement defamatory of some person in government
catches the public's interest; that conclusion would virtually disregard society's inter-
est in protecting reputation. The employee's position must be one which would invite
public scrutiny and discussion of the person holing it, entirely apart from the scrutiny
and discussion occasioned by the particular charges in controversy.
Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 86 n.13. Contrary to the view in Elder's article, the author of this Com-
ment argues that this footnote does not refer to the "second definition" offered in Rosenblatt.
Rather it is only a response to Justice Douglas' concurrence. Justice Douglas uses the night
watchman scenario to illustrate that it is important to protect public issues without reference to
position in government of persons involved in that issue. In other words, Justice Douglas was
advocating the Rosenbloom speech-type approach in this pre-Rosenbloom dissent. This is not sur-
prising, as Justice Douglas was a regular proponent of expansion of First Amendment protection
to all speech on issues of public interest. The footnote can best be viewed in two parts. First, the
footnote says that to use a speech-type approach extending to all issues of public interest would
not adequately protect reputation. Secondly, beginning with "the employee's position," the foot-
note is restating for the third time what kind of position will be considered as requiring application
of the New York Times actual malice standard: somebody so important that she would be a valid
target of public discussion entirely apart from an issue of public interest. The phrasing of the
last sentence of the footnote also puts to rest the fear that the press could generate an issue of
public interest, and thus generate a "public official" out of a citizen. This last sentence is merely
a bonus. The primary function of this footnote is not to limit any of the two other statements
regarding public officials, but to rebut the concurrence's suggestion that protection of all issues
of public interest is appropriate. The footnote misrepresents Justice Douglas' dissent, which is
actually suggesting that the majority's test would not apply to the night watchman, but this does
not change the function of the footnote as a response to Justice Douglas' concerns.
75. The term "interest" in the first statement offered by the Rosenblatt Court refers to the
public's stake in free speech. That is also the most likely interpretation for the term "interest" in
the second statement offered by the Rosenblatt Court. See supra note 74.
76. Appearance to the public of control and responsibility was likely the only reason the
county employee in Rosenblatt could be considered a public official.
Seattle University Law Review
society has an interest in free speech about the position holder that is
more important than reputational interest for the New York Times
conditional privilege to properly apply.
In light of the Court's expressed concern discussed above, the
definition that emerges from Rosenblatt is conceptually proper."
However, various misinterpretations of the second statement regard-
ing public officials in the Rosenblatt decision have caused significant
state court confusion.7" The second statement has been interpreted as
a limitation and has been applied in conjunction with the first state-
ment to create a definition.79 While this interpretation is not accu-
rate,80 infusing a strong focus on power and influence over government
(or protection of only core political speech and public issues) into the
interpretation renders its inaccuracy harmless."1
A more significant problem occurs when courts treat this second
statement as a stand-alone definition, allowing them to hold that if
there is public interest in a position, it falls within the definition of a
public official.8 2 Only if read out of context can the Rosenblatt passage
support this misinterpretation. 3 Such a misreading renders the deci-
sion internally inconsistent, because it functions to make public inter-
est the determinant of public official status. The Rosenblatt court,
however, rejects that very concept in footnote thirteen of the opinion.8 4
Moreover, courts choosing to follow this misinterpretation must often
attempt to reconcile a government position that has no responsibility
or control over government functioning with a valid argument that
there is a high level of public interest in the position.85
In addition, the misinterpretation functions to make speech of
interest to the public the ultimate reason why New York Times is ap-
77. See generally Elder, supra note 74, for an evaluation of the merits of the Rosenblatt
definition of public official. While the author of this Comment disagrees with Elder on the exact
mechanisms behind lower court confusion, both this Comment and the Elder article conclude
that misinterpretations of the Rosenblatt decision are primarily responsible for state court prob-
lems with the definition of public official.
78. See generally id.
79. See, e.g., Clawson v. Longview Publ'g Co., 91 Wash. 2d 408, 598 P.2d 1223 (1979) (Rosel-
lini, J., dissenting).
80. While the statement seems to be a limitation, its limitation is internal; it does not relate back
to the first statement.
81. See, e.g., Franklin v. Lodge 1108, Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks, 97 Cal. App. 3d
915(1979).
82. See Johnson v. S.W. Newspapers Corp., 855 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993);
McNultz v. Kessler, 1995 WL 809931 (Mass. Super. Apr. 3, 1995).
83. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., Kelley v. Bonney, 606 A.2d 693 (1992); see also Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443
U.S. 111 (1979) for how the Court has had to deal with the problems that come from the use of"public interest" as a defining mechanism.
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plied. This would be indistinguishable from a speech type approach
that protects all speech of public interest. This approach was express-
ly rejected in Gertz v. Welch. 6
The Gertz decision did several important things. It redirected
inquiry of application of the New York Times conditional privilege to
the status of the defamed individual; 7 it reviewed the line of cases fol-
lowing New York Times; and it reiterated the importance of the repu-
tation interest and the validity of the New York Times privilege's
balance between the competing interests." The Gertz Court did not,
however, offer a definition of "public official."89
The Gertz court set out two factors, access to media and accep-
tance of risk of public scrutiny, as justifications for treating public and
private plaintiffs differently.9" Unfortunately, many courts use these
justifications to define public persons.91 This approach results from a
misreading of the text.92 It is a significant misuse of Gertz and results
in an entirely inappropriate definition of public official. 93
Because so many courts have misread and misused Gertz in this
fashion, it is necessary to demonstrate why this reading of the text is
erroneous. First, Gertz clearly stated that these factors will not apply
to all public persons. 94 . Therefore, use of the factors produces a test in
contradiction of the express language of Gertz, as well as one subject
to the vagaries of interpretation. Second, Gertz recognized that"access to the media" does not guarantee an adequate remedy for a
defamed plaintiff. Even with access to a rebuttal forum, rebuttals
usually do not repair the damage done. Access to media may be
indicative of a general attribute of public persons that justifies less
protection for their reputations, but it is an uncertain test factor at
best. Third, "accepting the risk of public scrutiny" is a meaningless
86. 418 U.S. 323 (1973).
87. Id. at 345-46.
88. Id. at 341.
89. See id. at 344.
90. Id. at 344-45.
91. See, e.g., Clawson v. Longview Publ'g Co., 91 Wash. 2d 408, 598 P.2d 1223 (1979).
Clawson is unusual, however, in that it uses the factors as a definition of public officials; they are
more commonly used to define public figures.
92. See id. "[W]e have no difficulty in distinguishing among defamation plaintiffs."
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344. In the context of the opinion, this statement refers to the Court's forth-
coming explanation for why it will treat public and private persons differently. The passage does
not mean that the Court is laying out a definition of public persons. See also Marc A. Franklin,
Constitutional Libel Law: The Role of Content, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1657, 1663 (1987) (the factors
are justifications for focusing on status of the plaintiff, rather than content of speech).
93. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
94. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
95. Id. at 344 n.9.
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standard, unless there is, or is likely to be, public scrutiny. If taken as
a defining characteristic of public plaintiffs, "acceptance of risk"
would cause public scrutiny-public interest-to trigger application of
the actual malice standard. This result would be identical to the
Rosenbloom framework, an application of the New York Times privilege
to any issue of public interest regardless of the status of the individual
defamed. That concept is exactly what the Gertz decision rejects.
Therefore, Rosenblatt is a better reflection of the Supreme Court's
intent regarding public official status. The factors laid out in Gertz
may be a useful supplement to Rosenblatt, but they should not stand
alone.96
V. WASHINGTON STATE: DEFINING PUBLIC OFFICIALS
The Washington Supreme Court, in Clawson v. Longview, cre-
ated one of the most unique tests for determining whether the New
York Times conditional privilege should apply to a particular plain-
tiff.97 The Clawson court created its test by elevating the Gertz factors
into its criteria for the determination of the plaintiffs status.98 Then,
the court modified final application of the actual malice standard
based on the subject matter of the defamation.99
The libel plaintiff in Clawson was a nonelected public sector
employee, who was an administrator of a county motor pool. The
Clawson court determined the plaintiffs public official status by plac-
ing primary emphasis on assumption of risk of public scrutiny. 100 Cit-
ing Gertz, the Clawson court asserted that even nonelected public
officials and public sector employees must expect a degree of public
interest in the performance of their duties, and thus that they have
accepted the risk of being involved in public speech and are properly
classified as public officials.1'0  This broad definition potentially
includes any public employee."°2
96. See Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Who Is a "Public Official"for Purposes of Defama-
tion Action, 44 A.L.R.5th 193 (1996) (indicating that access to media is a factor that may bolster
an argument of public official status). A court should be careful not to place too much emphasis
on access to media and acceptance of risk, however. See, e.g., Kassel v. Gannett Co., Inc., 875
F.2d 935 (1989) (using access to media and accepting the risk of public scrutiny as the second
and third factors in determining a plaintiffs status).
97. Clawson, 91 Wash. 2d 408, 598 P.2d 1223. For an early review of the case, see David
G. Stebig, Libel, 15 GONZ. L. REV. 575 (1980).
98. Clawson, 91 Wash. 2d at 414, 598 P.2d at 1226.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 416, 598 P.2d at 1227.
101. Id.
102. While the Clawson court implied that not all public employees are public officials, id.
at 417, 598 P.2d at 1227, this is not set forth clearly, and the only published Washington case
interpreting Clawson does not pick up on that important restriction. See Himango v. Prime
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Recognizing the sweep of that definition, the court then identi-
fied two "pertinent variables" to determine how much of a public offi-
cial's life should be subject to public scrutiny: (1) the importance of
the position held, and (2) the nexus between that position and the
defamatory statements."0 3 Thus, publications regarding the private
life of a high ranking government employee are likely to be considered
to have a "nexus" with his public official status. Conversely, "[w]hen
the individual is less powerful... exposure is limited to matters more
closely connected to actual job performance. "14
Therefore, the court declared that the administrator of a county
motor pool with unsupervised discretion over expenditures of county
funds could be considered a "public official."' 5 Although the position
was "near the bottom" of the public official category, the nexus
between the public official's duties and the content of the defamatory
statements (allegations of improper use of county resources) "could
not be closer, as they related directly to the respondent's job perform-
ance. '"106 The court justified its conclusion by pronouncing it consis-
tent with "a substantial body of law which has developed since New
York Times," and citing a list of cases where persons in nonelected
government positions have been considered public officials in other
jurisdictions.° 7
Although the outcome in Clawson is congruent with the outcome
of other cases, those cases are often based on faulty analyses of Su-
preme Court doctrine. Many of the cases cited by the Clawson court
rely on a misreading of Rosenblatt, focusing on the "public interest"
aspect of its second definition.0 8 This misapplication leads to the
same type of conclusion reached by the Clawson court, but equally
erroneous.10 9
Time Broad. Inc., 37 Wash. App. 259, 262, 680 P.2d 432, 436 (1984), rev. denied, 102 Wash. 2d
1004 (1984). Therefore, a practical application of Washington law could mean that all public
employees will have to prove actual malice, as long as the defamation relates to their job.
103. Clawson, 91 Wash. 2d at 417, 598 P.2d at 1227-28. See also Finkelson, supra note 34.
Mr. Finkelson applauds this step of the Clawson test, but the author of this Comment disagrees
with that praise. Both Mr. Finkelson and the Clawson court improperly focus on access to media
and acceptance of risk as defining factors for public persons. See supra notes 92, 96 and accom-
panying text.
104. Himango, 37 Wash. App. at 262, 680 P.2d at 436.
105. Clawson, 91 Wash. 2d at 416, 598 P.2d at 1227.
106. Id. at 417, 598 P.2d at 1227-28.
107. Id. at 418, 598 P.2d at 1228.
108. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. Elder expresses a different view on how
Rosenblatt has been misapplied.
109. This is beginning to be recognized. One of the cases cited in Clawson, Basarich v.
Rodeghero, 321 N.E.2d 739 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974), has been rejected by subsequent rulings in the
same jurisdiction because the decision "confused and collapsed" the "public figure" and "public
official" categories. True v. Ladner, 513 A.2d 257, 264 n.8 (Me. 1986). The Clawson court also
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Washington recognizes that United States Supreme Court cases
are controlling,"' yet Washington's test is wholly unlike that set forth
in New York Times and its progeny. Through its misinterpretation of
Gertz, Washington has created (a) a broad definition of public official
based upon the concept of assumed risk, which extends to nonelected
public sector employees, and (b) an application of the New York Times
privilege that is limited by the content of the defamatory publication.
In contrast, New York Times and its progeny delineate (a) a narrow
definition of public official based on power and influence, and (b) an
expanded application of the New York Times actual malice standard to
all conduct which might bear upon a public official's fitness for office.
Washington law is thus likely to have a very different outcome
than that intended by the United States Supreme Court. New York
Times and Gertz intended to honor both the state interest in protecting
citizens against defamation and the constitutional interests in free
speech. The actual malice standard is not intended to be applied to
any unwary citizen who goes in for public service."' Washington law
potentially applies the New York Times conditional privilege for speech
on any public servant--doing so when the plaintiff's position is likely
to attract attention or to warrant scrutiny by members of the public,
that is, when there is "public interest" in the position. As discussed
above, this is the Rosenbloom holding, rejected by Gertz.
Additionally, Washington law functions to provide less protec-
tion for an individual's professional reputation than for his private
one. Nowhere in New York Times or its progeny is it stated or implied
that professional reputations are less deserving of protection than pri-
vate ones. Rather, New York Times indicated that when a plaintiff is a"public official," the official's personal and professional reputation
will receive the same lower level of protection. 12
The Washington Supreme Court should rethink its definition of
"public official" in order to align itself with the United States Supreme
Court. Its definition of public official should be appropriately narrow,
in accordance with the importance of protecting reputation and the
need to protect speech that is close to the political end of the contin-
cites Reaves v. Foster, 200 So. 2d. Declining to follow Reaves, the court in Ellerbee v. Mills, 422
S.E.2d 539 (Ga. 1992), noted that school principals are not public officials because implicit in the
reasoning of New York Times was the concept that people should be free to criticize those who
govern them. The court stated that principals do not have such a relationship with government.
Id. at 539-40. See also Elder, supra note 74 at 635, 668. Elder sharply criticizes Clawson and
other cases that found lower echelon public employees to be public officials.
110. Clawson, 91 Wash. 2d at 413-14.
111. Id. at 421, (RoselliniJ., dissenting); Elder, supra note 74, at 658.
112. Due to the broad definition of "official duties." See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 282 (1964).
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uum. 1 3 A better test for public officials would use Rosenblatt as its
backbone and fill in gaps using the Gertz factors. However, any test
should acknowledge the need to find a balance closer to the political
end of the spectrum and scrupulously refrain from using public inter-
est as a triggering event for public official status.
VI. DEFINING PUBLIC FIGURES
The law regarding public figures under the New York Times con-
ditional privilege is subject to even more definitional problems than
public officials. A wide variety of views have been expressed on the
definition and all of its aspects.'14 However, most of the views and
academic evaluations become moot if the purpose of the actual malice
conditional privilege is considered.
New York Times was meant to establish a balance between two
competing interests. It evaluates when self-censorship of speech is so
costly to our society that we will sacrifice protection of personal repu-
tation in order to prevent it. The balance struck protects speech only
when it is political in nature or concerns issues that lay close to politi-
cal speech on the continuum."' It is no different when the plaintiff is
a public figure than when he is a public official. Public figures should
be defined so that protection is focused on that range of speech." 6
In public figures cases, other problematic applications of the
actual malice standard may occur because of the parallel roots of com-
mon law. At common law, the lack of a right to privacy for public fig-
ures was created by the public's interest." 7 Persons of fame or notori-
ety became and were legitimate targets of public interest. These per-
sons were deemed to have lost their right to privacy because they had
assumed the risk of publicity, because their affairs had become part of
the public domain, and the press had a privilege to report on issues of
public interest." 8
113. See Elder, supra note 74, demonstrating another good tool for applying the New York
Times actual malice standard.
114. Debated aspects of the public figure include: general versus limited public figures, intro-
duced by Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1973); formal versus equitable mechanisms of determining
public figure status, see Nat Stem, Unresolved Antitheses of the Limited Public Figure Doctrine, 33
HOUS. L. REV. 1027 (1996); necessity of public controversy versus mere presence of a public issue,
see Wolston v. Reader's Digest Association, Inc., 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
115. New York Times, 376 U.S. 254.
116. See Frederick Schauer, Public Figures, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 905 (1984) and Ger-
ald G. Ashdown, Of Public Figures and Public Interest-The Libel Law Conundrum, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 937 (1983/1984). These articles recognize and debate this idea and its applica-
tion.
117. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 115 at
831 (5th ed. 1984).
118. Id.
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New York Times and its progeny are not incongruent with these
common law ideas. In as much as they relate to speech or are general
indicators of public figures, these common law ideas have merit.
However, a person's interests in privacy and reputation are not identi-
cal." 9 While a famous person may have lost his or her right to privacy
by having a famous life, that person need not substantially abdicate his
interest in his good name as well. Arguably, the good reputations of
some famous persons, i.e., those who make a living off of their reputa-
tions, are in need of greater protection.
120
Public figures are correctly ascribed a separate and different defi-
nition under New York Times and its progeny than at common law. 2
Just as when defining public official, when defining public figures, it is
important to keep in mind that the actual malice standard is intended
to protect speech that is close to the political speech end of the contin-
uum.
There have been two phases in the development of the defama-
tion definition of public figures. The first phase is represented by
Curtis v. Butts and its companion case, Walker v. Associated Press.
Curtis v. Butts involved a published accusation of a conspiracy to "fix"
a university football game. The plaintiff, Butts, was a privately
employed athletic director for one of the teams. He was "well-known"
and respected in coaching ranks, and he was negotiating to secure a
position with a professional team when the publication occurred.
12
The publication in Walker v. Associated Press stated that the plaintiff,
Walker, had encouraged rioters and participated in resisting federal
marshals during a campus riot touched off by a desegregation order.'23
Walker had made a number of anti-desegregation statements that had
been widely published, gaining a following known as "the Friends of
Walker." He could "fairly be deemed a man of some political promi-
nence."124
Both plaintiffs were found to be public figures in Justice Harlan's
opinion, writing for the Court. 25 However, the Warren concurrence
commands the majority. The two justices seemed to have different
concepts of public figures in mind.
119. See Times, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
120. This is the strongest argument against the prevailing definitions for "general" public
figures. See Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
121. See Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S.
130 (1975) (Warren J., concurring).
122. Curtis Publishing Co., 388 U.S. at 135-36.
123. Id. at 140.
124. Id. at 140.
125. Id. at 154.
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Justice Harlan summarily classifies the plaintiffs as public fig-
ures, because he uses a definition of public figures from common
law. 126 However, the Harlan opinion sets out a fault standard less
stringent than actual malice for speech about these public figures. 127
The Warren concurrence claims to be in disagreement only with this
new fault standard, and it does not specifically object to classifying the
plaintiffs as public figures. 128  However, the language Justice Warren
uses to express disagreement with the fault standard conflicts with a
broad definition of public figures.
The Warren opinion states that it is not reasonable to differenti-
ate between public figures and public officials vis-a-vis a fault stand-
ard, because public figures are increasingly part of and have influence
over the resolution of public issues. Justice Warren's opinion seems to
be premised on a vision of a public figure that looks very much like a
public official. 129 The language 3 ° indicates an understanding that the
type of speech at issue for public figure defamation cases is that of
political speech or public issue speech, not public interest speech."'
As the Warren concurrence commands the majority, the Harlan opin-
ion and its common law understanding of public figures carries no
precedential value. 3 2  Further, such an understanding of public fig-
ures is overturned by Gertz,'33 the second defining phase of public fig-
ures.
126. Id. at 154.
127. Justice Harlan states that constitutional protection is necessary for all types of speech,
not merely "political expression or comment on public affairs." Id. at 147 (quoting Time Inc. v.
Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967)). However, he opines that the harsh requirements of New York
Times are not appropriate "throughout the realm of [this] broader constitutional interest." Id. at
148.
128. Curtis, 388 U.S. at 162. Perhaps the incongruence between the language of Justice
Warren's opinion and finding a privately paid athletic director to be a public figure can be recon-
ciled by noting that Curtis is a pre-Gertz decision. There is significant focus in Curtis on the
public's interest in football and the fixing of games. Id. at 154-55. From a public interest view-
point, then, Curtis would qualify as a public figure. The later analysis of Curtis in Firestone
omits discussion of Butts and focuses entirely on Walker, perhaps in recognition that Butts could
not be included as a public figure under Gertz. See Time v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976).
129. See Frederick Schauer, Public Figures, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 905, 912-14 (1984).
130. The language of the opinion is reminiscent of C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE POWER
ELITE (New York, Oxford University Press, 1959). The term refers to a sociological theory that
the same individuals may be found at the highest levels of government, industry, and the mili-
tary. Justice Warren appears to recognize that an overlap of individual power similar to Mills'
theory requires an application of the New York Times conditional privilege that is specifically tied
to influence over government. Cf. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
131. See Shauer, supra note 6, at 914.
132. In either case, the result is that Curtis cannot be said to require an application of the
New York Times actual malice standard to speech of "public interest." Neither the Harlan nor
the Warren opinion supports extension of the privilege to this type of speech.
133. Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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Gertz offered a definition of public figure that differed from the
common law definition. 134 Unfortunately, the definition of public fig-
ure is an aggregate of language scattered throughout the opinion.
135
Portions of the definition are easily misused if the clarifications offered
by the Gertz decision are ignored-which they often are. If a court
focuses on a partial definition, it is likely to derive a skewed interpre-
tation of the Gertz Court's defamation-First Amendment compro-
mise. The resulting outcome is likely to be a broad application of New
York Times based on a misguided intent to protect all speech on issues
of public interest with the actual malice standard."3 6
The full definition of public figure from Gertz is:
For the most part those who attain this status have assumed
roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society. Some
occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence that
they are deemed public figures for all purposes. More com-
monly, those classed as public figures have thrust themselves to
134. Id. Gertz was an attorney representing a family in a civil action against a police officer
for the murder of their son. A local magazine published an article stating that the case against
the officer was part of a Communist campaign against the police. The article alleged Gertz had a
criminal record and was a member of several communist organizations involved in subversive
activities against the government. The Gertz Court found the plaintiff had not thrust himself
into the vortex of this public issue (a nationwide conspiracy to harass the police), nor did he
engage the public's attention in an attempt to influence its outcome. Thus, the Court looked at a
public issue close to the political end of the speech continuum and required a level of particip a-
tion that was not met by the plaintiff.
135. There are three locations of a definition of public figures in Gertz. The most general
of the definitions is: "Those who, by reason of the notoriety of their achievements or the vigor
and success with which they seek the public's attention, are properly classed as public figures..."
Id. at 342. Using this definition will result in an incorporation of every successful celebrity, even
those who are reclusive and shun public involvement, into the category of public figure. In the
second definition the Court divides up the category of public figure into the now well-known "all
purpose" and "limited public figures":
In some instances an individual may achieve such pervasive fame or notoriety that he
becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts. More commonly, an indi-
vidual voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy and
thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues.
Id. at 351. This definition is not complete, and is still misleading. The best and most complete
definition provided in Gertz is:
For the most part those who attain this status have assumed roles of especial promi-
nence in the affairs of society. Some occupy positions of such persuasive power and
influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes. More commonly, those
classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public
controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved. In either
event, they invite attention and comment.
Id. at 345.
136. The fact that the Gertz Court's language can appear to support both a broad and a
narrow definition of public figures is rarely acknowledged. See Brewer v. Memphis Pub. Co.,
Inc., 626 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1980), for a recognition of the possibilities and a reason for choos-
ing acceptance of risk and access to the media as factors to focus on.
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the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influ-
ence the resolution of the issues involved. In either event, they
invite attention and comment. 37
This definition has been preferentially used in subsequent
Supreme Court cases.13  It indicates that more than fame, public
prominence, or notoriety is required to classify a plaintiff as a public
figure: the fame, prominence, or notoriety must be as a result of or
used in the resolution of public questions. It is this part of the defini-
tion that makes public figures similar to public officials, because the
Court's use of the word "resolution" implies the ability to influence.'39
An emphasis on influence is the most important element of
defining public figures, if public figures are to be delimited in accor-
dance with protection of public issue and political speech, instead of
public interest speech. Emphasis on influence is also consistent with
the Warren opinion in Curtis that a public figure is a nongovernment
employee with the same type of influence over society as a public offi-
cial. 4° Additionally, by reference to the general concern of the Court
for speech on public issues, "public controversies" is best interpreted
as closer to the political end of the continuum.
However, courts use other language from Gertz to support defi-
nitions that are focused almost entirely on the fame of the individual.
Such definitions consider, not an individual's influence over public
issues, but rather his visibility, including access to media, and whether
such visibility is the result of intentional acts. 141
For instance, the offhanded remark, "In either event, they invite
attention and comment," is often repeated by lower courts.'42 The
proper reading of this statement is that attention and comment are the
137. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345 (emphasis added).
138. See Time v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 456 (1976); Reader's Digest, Inc. v. Wolston,
443 U.S. 157, 165 (1979); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 134 (1979). This definition is
indicative of a narrow view of public figures, which in turn is indicative of a focus on protection
of speech on public issues, not issues of public interest.
139. See Stem, supra note 115. Mr. Stem's article focuses on the "public question" por-
tion, as do many courts. See Wolston, 443 U.S. at 167 n.8 (1979). Both elements are essential,
however. Without public controversy, any person of power or prominence within a finite uni-
verse would be a "public" figure. See Miller v. Transamerican Press, 621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir.
1980). This is not a problem, however, if it is required that the defamatory statements be ger-
mane only to the individual's influence within that finite universe. Without influence though,
fame and its various generating factors form a broad and undiscriminating definition.
140. Thus, it may help in defining public figures to keep Rosenblatt in mind. The Rosen-
blatt conception of influence would include both actual and apparent influence.
141. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
142. Id. Whether a subjective or objective invitation, it is problematic either way. The
phrase is often used standing alone by lower courts, but is not regularly reproduced by the
Supreme Court in its public figure decisions. It is cited in Wolston, 443 U.S. at 165, but not Fire-
stone, 424 U.S. at 453, or Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 134.
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likely results of the actions (a thrust into the vortex with intent to
influence, or engagement of the public with intent to influence) taken
by a public figure. It is error to use public attention and comment as
defining characteristics of public figures for the same reason that it is
error to use access to media and acceptance of risk as defining charac-
teristics of public officials.143
A definition based on fame is entirely inconsistent with Gertz,
because fame is really indistinguishable from public interest. Gertz
rejected application of the New York Times conditional privilege to
speech on issues of public interest, but advocated application of the
privilege to speech on public figures. However, the Court in Firestone
points out the impropriety of defining public figures by fame or noto-
riety.' 4
The Firestone case involved publications on the divorce pro-
ceedings of a wealthy couple. The former wife had provided several
press conferences in order to provide requested information to the
media. The Firestone court indicated that to term the divorce pro-
ceedings a "public controversy" would be to equate public controversy
with "controversies of interest to the public" and would effectively
reinstate the Rosenbloom approach.'45
The court also specifically contrasted the former wife with "Gen-
eral" Walker from Curtis.'46 Whereas Ms. Firestone was involved
only in the court proceedings of her divorce, Mr. Walker was involved
in a student riot over racial desegregation that clashed with federal
troops. Ms. Firestone had provided press conferences to provide
information in response to media requests; Mr. Walker "was acutely
interested in the issue of physical federal intervention [to enforce
desegregation] and had made a number of strong statements against
such action which had received wide publicity." Ms. Firestone could,
at most, be said to be especially prominent in "Palm Beach society."
Mr. Walker, on the other hand, had his own following, the "Friends
of Walker," and could fairly be deemed a "man of some political
prominence." Thus, Firestone indicates that public persons should be
defined in a manner that more closely resembles public officials, cov-
ering public issue speech.'47
143. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
144. Time v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
145. Id. at 454.
146. Id. at 454-55. Also worth noting, Walker and Butts were companion cases, but Fire-
stone does not mention the facts from Butts in its analysis. It is unlikely that Butts would be
found to be a public figure if a court used the Warren language in Curtis or Gertz as its guide.
The Firestone decision was made using Butts reasoning, but Butts is not mentioned.
147. Compare Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 140 (1967) and Firestone, 424
U.S. at 453-54 n.3.
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The Wolston decision also reflects a narrow definition of public
figures."' Wolston was subpoenaed as a witness in an espionage case
but did not obey the subpoena. Later prosecuted and convicted for
the refusal to obey the court command, Wolston did not otherwise get
involved in the trial. The district court held that "Wolston became
involved in a controversy of a decidedly public nature in a way that
invited attention and comment and thereby created in the public an
interest in knowing about his connection with espionage." 149
Fortunately, the Supreme Court reproduced the exact language
of the ruling and firmly rejected it. The Wolston Court held that pri-
vate persons do not become public persons just because they are
involved, however self-determinedly, in an issue of public interest. 50
Nor would mere involvement in a public issue equate to public figure-
hood. Rather, the Court indicated that there must be actual contro-
versy or debate regarding a public issue.15'
Courts should take the Wolston holding as a reminder that the
public's interest in an issue has nothing to do with whether or not the
plaintiff is a public figure for the purpose of applying the New York
Times conditional privilege. Public interest does not create the public
person, and "inviting attention and comment is not sufficient."
Rather, there must be an attempt by the plaintiff to influence a public
issue.
[Wolston]'s failure to respond... was in no way calculated to
draw attention to himself in order to invite public comment
[upon the issue]' 2or influence the public with respect to any
issue. He did not in any way seek to arouse public sentiment in
his favor and against the litigation. [T]his is not a case where a
defendant invites a citation for contempt in order to use [it] as a
fulcrum to create public discussion... t' It is clear that peti-
tioner played only a minor role in whatever public controversy
there may have been concerning the investigation of Soviet
148. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Association, Inc., 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
149. Id. at 165.
150. Id. at 166.
151. The court in Wolston assumes arguendo that propriety of the actions of law enforce-
ment officials in investigating and prosecuting suspected Soviet agents is a "public controversy."
Id. at 167 n.8.
152. Without this clarification, this statement could appear to condone labeling any Holly-
wood star a public figure because she has invited public attention. Id. at 166. That would be
incongruent with the other ideas expressed in the same passage, and in contradiction with the
definition set forth in Gertz. "Some occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence
that they are deemed public figures for all purposes." Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1973).
153. Wolston, 443 U.S. at 166.
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espionage. 154
Therefore, public figures must be ascribed a different defining
mechanism than mere fame or acceptance of risk of public scrutiny.
The above definition set out from Gertz provides the most material for
defining public persons. However, the definition is not without prob-
lems. It would seem that the definition of a limited purpose public
figure will hinge on whether the controversy at issue is "public," and
this determination leads again to the problem of courts deciding where
speech falls along the continuum. However, "public controversy,"
like "public figure," could be sketched out as a term of art, keeping in
mind the type of speech that the court is concerned with. 5' That way,
courts would not use public controversy as a threshold or defining
mechanism.
The Supreme Court, in its efforts to find the correct line, has
been hampered by listless decisions and an unwillingness to delve into
the law. Hutchinson v. Proxmire is one such example.1"6 In that case,
the district court had held that Hutchinson, a scientist who success-
fully solicited grants from the government, had voluntarily involved
himself in an issue of public interest. Thus, the district court con-
cluded, Hutchinson was a public figure. The Supreme Court rejected
the lower court's holding. Its primary reasons were that Hutchinson
had no predefamation access to the media and that if "expenditure of
funds" is used as an issue of public interest, then too many people
involved with receiving government funds will be classified as public
figures.
Instead of setting forth correct interpretations of the definition of
public figure, Hutchinson simply addressed the issues exactly as the
trial court had viewed them. The Hutchinson Court's first error was in
not rejecting the access to media argument, merely overturning the
district court's evaluation of Hutchinson's access. As discussed above,
the access to media factor was never intended to be a test for defining
public figures.
The second error of the Hutchinson Court was its acceptance of
the partial definition of public figure that was used by the trial court.
In order to limit the scope of this overblown definition, the Court had
to summarily exclude speech on expenditures of public funds from the
154. Id.
155. Courts could look at combined factors: the likelihood or the intention to influence,
how close the controversy is to a political issue, and whether the defamatory comment relates to
the person's involvement or fitness to influence the outcome. This is similar to the "equitable
approach" described in Stem's article, supra note 115.
156. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
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constitutional protection, even though this is a public issue bordering
on core political speech.
This case could have been resolved simply if the Hutchinson
Court had referred back to the Gertz definition of public figures. Mr.
Hutchinson would not be a public figure, because he lacked fame or
notoriety acquired by influence over public affairs. Mr. Hutchinson
played no role of special prominence in deciding how public funds
should be spent. In contrast, someone who does have such influence
over government expenditures must be considered a public figure, if
the First Amendment protections set out by New York Times are to be
honored.'57
Even in view of the Hutchinson case, the main body of Supreme
Court rulings in public figure cases supports the contention that the
public figure category is narrowly delineated.'58
VII. DEFINING PUBLIC FIGURES: WASHINGTON STATE
Washington State has derived its current law defining public fig-
ures from Clardy v. Cowles." 9 The Clardy case involved publication
of the details and dirt on past business dealings of the developer of a
housing project within the local circulation area of the publishing
newspaper. The developer sued the publisher, and was found to be a
limited public figure vis-a.-vis the housing project. The case shows a
strong First Amendment stance, the classic misunderstandings of
Gertz, and is complicated by poor editing.6 °
The Clardy court expressed concern that past Washington cases
did not consider the plaintiffs opportunity for rebuttal, claiming that
Gertz found the access to media to be an important consideration. 6'
In reality, Gertz stated that this general attribute of public persons was
a weak justification for applying the New York Times actual malice
standard, because rebuttal is hardly ever as effective as the original
libel.'62
The Clardy opinion further reflects a complete misunderstanding
of the issues at stake. The court represents the issues as "balancing
the right to report on issues of public interest against the right of pri-
157. For a different opinion on what went wrong in Hutchinson, see Bruce J. Borrus, Defa-
mation and the First Amendment: Protecting Speech on Public Issues, 56 WASH. L. REV. 75 (1980).
158. See Elder, supra note 74 ("[T]he Court has unambiguously constricted the field of
application of the more exacting New York Times standard in 'public figure' cases...
159. 81 Wash. App. 53, 912 P.2d 1078 (1996).
160. The strong First Amendment stance is illustrated by its tone and use of references:
the Court cites academic critics of the Gertz opinion's focus on individuals rather than a broad
speech type approach in Rosenbloom. Id. at 58.
161. Id. at 62.
162. Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 344-45 (1973).
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vate citizens to be free from defamatory comments .... "163 This inter-
pretation reflects a severe departure from the carefully crafted compro-
mise of New York Times and Gertz: balancing the public's stake in
speech on public issues against an individual's interest in his reputa-
tion. The right to report on public issues is not at stake. Rather, at
stake is the constitutional privilege to defame in order to prevent self-
censorship of speech on political or quasi-political speech. Addi-
tionally, the issue is not the right to be free of defamatory comments,
but rather the ability to redress defamatory comments through state
laws.
The Clardy court borrows a five part test from another jurisdic-
tion in order to meet what it perceives to be the important issues. The
test relies on whether (1) the plaintiff had access to channels of effec-
tive communication, (2) the plaintiff voluntarily assumed a role of spe-
cial prominence in the public controversy, (3) the plaintiff sought to
influence the resolution or outcome of the controversy, (4) the contro-
versy existed prior to the publication of the defamatory statement, and
(5) the plaintiff retained public figure status at the time of the alleged
defamation.'64
Unfortunately, after stating it would follow this test, the Clardy
court instead proceeded to look at different factors. The five issues
that the Clardy opinion actually addressed are: (1) access to the
media, (2) voluntariness and nature of role, (3) statements germane to
the controversy, (4) prior existence of controversy, and (5) plaintiffs
retention of public figure status. 6 S
As discussed, access to media is too problematic of a factor to be
considered for defining public figures. The Clardy court's test, as
actually applied, also disregards influence over public controversy.
The adopted test focuses two factors on influence: (2) a role of special
prominence and (3) seeking to influence. Clardy collapsed these fac-
tors into "voluntariness and nature of role," thereby omitting reference
to the most important aspect of public figures. Influence is discussed
under Clardy's second factor, but the focus is on voluntariness of
involvement rather than on ability to influence.'66
163. Clardy, 81 Wash. App. at 62.
164. Clardy, 81 Wash. App. at 60.
165. Id. at 62-65.
166. Possibly because it may have seemed to the court that voluntary involvement is de facto an
attempt to influence outcome. Clardy, 81 Wash. App. at 63-64. However, though an attempt to
influence can always be seen as voluntary involvement, the converse cannot be true if "influence" is
given a meaning consistent with protecting political speech and speech on public issues. Influence
reflects a measure of power and ability to cause change.
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Wolston and Hutchinson dealt with this improper focus by look-
ing at the nature of the public controversy. Although it is not entirely
clear from the opinion, it appears that the Clardy court found two"public" activities: (1) a newsletter that Clardy sent to local residents
in an attempt to influence public opinion regarding his housing proj-
ect, 167 and (2) Clardy's contact with local politicians in order to influ-
ence HUD's decision to provide funds for the project.168  Under
Wolston and Hutchinson, it is unlikely that either of these public events
would be understood as a public controversy.1
69
More correctly, the focus should be on the ability of the plaintiff,
actual or perceived, to influence the public controversy. 7 ' This idea is
entirely absent from the Clardy test.
Finally, the Clardy case included germaneness to controversy as
an element of its test. Germaneness is the public figure analog to"official conduct" of public officials. Although it- is a viable and
important factor, the Clardy decision failed to apply it properly. In
looking at public officials, the actual malice standard applies to any-
thing that relates to the official's fitness for office,' 7' that is, anything
that relates to the official's fitness to control or influence govern-
ment.' For public figures, the actual malice standard should apply to
anything that relates to the public figure's fitness to influence the out-
come of public controversies. The Clardy court did not attempt an
evaluation of this kind. 173
There are other definitions of public figure in other courts that
are much truer applications of the Gertz definition of public figures
167. Id. at 63-64.
168. Id. at 64.
169. Neither of these acts is clearly set out by Clardy as a public controversy. Negative
public opinion regarding the city of Spokane's approval of the housing development had been
reported in newspaper articles. But the housing development had already been approved. Id. at
64. Although Clardy attempted to influence public opinion in this area, public disapproval does
not equate to a public issue. That would be equivalent to asserting that public interest creates a
public issue, which was rejected in Firestone. The other potential public issue is the expenditure
of HUD funds. But Hutchinson held that attempts to procure government funding do not rise to
the level of attempting to influence public issues. The public's interest in the spending of public
funds is not sufficient to create a public figure.
170. The main problem with this test is that courts cite the definition, but fail to apply it
when looking at the nature and extent of the participation. For instance, WFAA-TV, Inc., v.
McLemore, 978 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. 1998), ignores the influence aspect of public figures, looking
instead to the voluntariness of the participation and access to the media. A similar problem can
be found in Harris v. Quadracci, 48 F.3d 247 (7th Cir. 1995). See Hill v. Evening News Co., 715
A.2d 999 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998), for a view of the vagaries of voluntariness of
participation in a criminal trial setting.
171. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
172. Id.
173. Clardy v. Cowles, 81 Wash. App. 53, 64, 912 P.2d 1078, 1086 (1996).
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than Clardy. The Circuit Court for the District of Columbia, in
Waldbaum v. Fairchild,7 4 set forth the following definition of public
figure: one who is "attempting to have, or realistically can be expected
to have, a major impact on the resolution of a specific public dispute
that has foreseeable and substantial ramifications for persons beyond
its immediate participants."' 75 The Waldbaum court set out a three
factor test to address this definition: (1) determining whether there is,
in fact, a public controversy, 176 (2) looking at the nature and extent of
the plaintiffs participation in that controversy, 77 and (3) determining
whether the speech was germane to the plaintiffs participation in the
controversy. 178
This definition and test, together, provide excellent guidance,
because they emphasize the important ideas from New York Times,
Rosenblatt, and Gertz and address the problems that the Gertz opinion
engenders. First, they speak to the idea that influence must be an
actual, or at least a perceived, possibility. Second, by focusing on a
controversy as opposed to the content of the speech, they ensure that
the issue will be more than one of mere public interest or newsworthi-
ness, and at the same time, they honor the concept that what is rele-
vant to self governance is for the public, not the courts, to
determine.'79 Third, they address the "official conduct" analog, ger-
maneness.
The Clardy court specifically declined to adopt this test. But
given its misunderstandings and initial viewpoint, that is not surpris-
ing. However, cases that have applied this test have a remarkable
grasp of an appropriate delineation of what is a public figure.'
Washington should view the Clardy decision as out of step with Su-
preme Court intent and cases and give the Waldbaum test another try.
174. Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1296.
177. Id. at 1297.
178. Id. at 1298.
179. See Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opin-
ion Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 603 (1990).
180. See, e.g., Silverster v. American Broadcasting Co. Inc., 839 F.2d 1491 (11th Cir.
1988); E. Hunter, M.D. v. Hartman and CBS, 545 N.W.2d 699 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996); Little v.
Breland, 93 F.3d 755 (11th Cir. 1996); Bay View Packing Co. v. Taff & WISN-TV, 543
N.W.2d 522 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995); Daniel Goldreyer, Ltd. v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., 678
N.Y.S.2d 453 (1998). Compare State Public Disclosure Commission v. Vote No! Committee,
135 Wash. 2d 618, 957 P.2d 691 (1998) and Clardy v. Cowles, 81 Wash. App. 53, 912 P.2d
1078 (1996) with Gaylord v. Entertainment Co. v. Thompson, 958 P.2d 128 (Okla. 1998) and
Doe v. Daily News, L.P., 632 N.Y.S.2d 750, 752 (1995). Note, however, that Washington has
adopted a negligence standard for defamatory speech on private persons. See Taskett v. King




At this time, the state courts are following New York Times and
its progeny for two reasons. The first is that it does state the mini-
mum requirements for safeguarding federal First Amendment rights.
Secondly, Rosenblatt mandates an adherence to federal definitions of
public officials and, by extension, public figures. The Supreme Court
has made clear, however, that its protections are merely minimum
requirements, and that states are free to provide more First Amend-
ment protections if they choose.
Because both the Clawson and the Clardy decisions function to
provide higher First Amendment protections, it may be that Wash-
ington would prefer a higher level of protection. The protections
should be provided by alternative means, not by stretching Supreme
Court decisions. A potential solution would be to sidestep the public
official and public figure determination altogether through use of the
state constitution.181  If the state constitution requires greater free
speech protections, then even a content-based test similar to that in
Rosenbloom may be possible."12
However, in nondefamation cases, or in those where defamation
is a peripheral issue, the Washington constitution will not provide
protections to speech at the expense of protection to reputation-not
generally, and certainly not in excess of the balance applicable to the
federal right.
For instance, Richmond v. Thompsonl"3 rejected an absolute privi-
lege for defamatory speech regarding police officers' field actions.
Citing a lack of either textual or historical support for absolute protec-
tion of defamatory speech, the Richmond court rejected both a consti-
tutional and a common law absolute privilege on the facts before it.
Thus, article I, section 5 does not require a complete or partial abro-
gation of the reputational interest through an absolute privilege."l 4
Whether a conditional privilege could have a broader application
under the Washington constitution was not addressed.
181. See Doe v. Daily News, L.P., 632 N.Y.S.2d 750, 752 (1995). This case may be an
attempt to assert independent state grounds for reaching its decision.
182. While the current Washington Supreme Court advocates strong free speech protec-
tions, and is disposed to develop state law independently of federal law, the author believes that a
Gunwall analysis of Article 1, Section 5 of the Washington constitution does not support a
speech protection broader than the First Amendment.
183. Richmond v. Thompson, 130 Wash. 2d 368,922 P.2d 1343 (1996).
184. Moreover, the dissent's objection focuses not on the requirements of§ 5, but rather on
that of§ 4, the right to petition. Id. at 389, 922 P.2d at 1354.
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Moreover, Washington courts have rejected the protection of
strict scrutiny in evaluating speech restrictions."' The rejection began
in Bering v. Share,186 where the court looked at time, manner, place,
and content restrictions imposed on antiabortion picketers by court
injunctions. The supreme court in Bering held without analysis that
Washington's speech provision was broader than its federal counter-
part. First, the court stated that, unlike the Federal Constitution, the
Washington constitution required a compelling interest and narrow
parameters for any time, manner, or place restrictions. Then, after
discussing post-publication sanctions, including the allowance of both
civil damage awards and injunctions under the Washington constitu-
tion (as responsibility for abuse of speech), the court adopted a strict
scrutiny approach for post-publication injunctive relief.87
Did the court merely exercise judicial restraint in its holding, or
did it mean to imply that Washington's constitution would provide
less speech protections when the method of sanctioning changes? The
court does not say. It is possible the court recognized that requiring a
strict scrutiny approach for civil damage awards would destroy torts
such as defamation. Did the court mean to say that in order to protect
the tort, or perhaps-where the reputation interest is at stake, free
speech is not so free after all? This is certainly implied in a recent
case, Vote No!.'88
Vote No! held unconstitutional a state law which sanctioned false
political advertising published with actual malice. The court held that
the law did not survive strict scrutiny, notably, because it did not
serve a compelling state interest. To address a state argument, the
court differentiated its facts from those of defamation cases: because
injury to reputation is by nature an individual injury, and because of
the special value of reputation in society, sanctions against defamatory
speech are specially allowed. 89 Although the court in Vote No! was
engaging in a federal law analysis, it signifies an understanding that
there is something different about a state sponsored defamation action
that prevents it from being treated as any other "state action." To-
gether with Bering, Vote No! represents a rejection by Washington
courts of the use of the strict scrutiny approach.
185. See supra note 12.
186. Bering v. Share, 106 Wash. 2d 212, 721 P.2d 918 (1986).
187. Id. at 230, 721 P.2d at 929.
188. State Public Disclosure Commission v. Vote No! Committee, 135 Wash. 2d 618, 957
P.2d 691 (1998).
189. In other words, because reputation is so important, defamation should not be analyzed
under the same rubric as other types of state action-strict scrutiny-because it probably would
not pass muster under that standard.
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Washington has therefore rejected the idea that its constitution
requires broader speech protections through either absolute privilege
or a strict scrutiny methodology. It would be consistent, therefore, to
find the Washington constitution does not require broader protection
through application of the actual malice standard to all speech of pub-
lic interest. This Comment concludes that the solution lies with the
legislature. Retraction statutes or statutes that provide for higher
standards of proof could provide the additional protection we have
come to expect for speech, avoiding the continuing struggle to define
public plaintiffs.'90
190. Such as in New York and South Dakota. See Chaiken v. VV Publishing Corp., 119
F.3d 1018 (2d Cir. 1997); Sparagon v. Native American Publishers, Inc., 542 N.W.2d 125 (S.D.
1996).
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